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The Constitutional Dimension
of Unilateral Change in Public-
Sector Collective Bargaining
Stephen F. Befort*
Introduction
The Great Recession that began in 2008 continues to wreak havoc
with public-sector budgets. The National Association of State Budget
Officers concluded that fiscal year 2010 "presented the most difficult
challenge for states' financial management since the Great Depres-
sion. . . ."' That organization's annual report for 2010 estimated that
states will face a total of $296.6 billion in budget shortfalls between fis-
cal years 2009 and 2012.2
While the severity of the current budget crisis may be unique, the
fact of its occurrence is not. The most recent crisis constitutes the
fourth such period in the last thirty years. In 1982, 1991, 2003-04,
and now in 2009-11, state and local government units have experi-
enced similar budget problems.3 Each period followed close behind an
economic downturn resulting in decreased tax revenues.4
With nearly every state required to maintain a balanced budget,5
state and local governments have scrambled for ways to reduce costs.
Not surprisingly, public employers frequently have taken aim at work-
force costs, one of their most significant discretionary expenses. 6
*Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty, & Bennett Professor of Law, University of Minnesota
Law School. The author thanks Mark Quade for his assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L AsS'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SuR-
VEY OF STATES vii (June 2010), http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/FiscalSurvey/tabid/65/
Default.aspx.
2. Id.
3. See Stephen F. Befort, Unilateral Alteration ofPublic Sector Collective Bargain-
ing Agreements and the Contract Clause, 59 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (2011).
4. Abby Goodnough, States Turning to Last Resorts in Budget Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2009, at Al; David E. Rosenbaum, Quick Change; States Balance Budgets With
Blue Smoke and Mirrors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2003, sec. 4, at 4; NA'L GOVERNORs ASS'N,
THE STATE FISCAL CRISIs (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.nga.org/nga/legislativeUpdate/1,1169,
C_ISSUEBRIEF%5ED_5080,00.html; Janet G. Stotsky, Coping with State Budget Defi-
cits, Bus. REV., Jan./Feb. 1991, at 12; Steven D. Gold, Federal Aid and State Finances, 35
NAT'L TAx J. 373, 380-81(1982).
5. Daniel Kadlec et al., How to Balance a Budget, TIME, Dec. 9, 2002, http://www.
time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1003856,00.html.
6. Salaries and wages alone constituted approximately 18.5% of all direct expendi-
tures by the states during the 2001-02 fiscal year. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF
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Governmental employers have resorted to layoffs, hiring freezes, wage
freezes, and employee furloughs among other strategies in order to
lower personnel expenditures.7
Sometimes, however, governmental entities have taken more
drastic measures, such as unilaterally modifying the terms of existing
collective bargaining agreements. In the private sector, such unilateral
action would be deemed both a breach of contract remediable in arbi-
tration and an unfair labor practice, subject to the jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Board (Board). Indeed, the Board has ruled
that economic necessity is no defense to such an unfair labor practice
finding.8
Most public-sector jurisdictions with collective bargaining laws
have adopted unilateral change principles similar to those in the pri-
vate sector.9 Unilateral change, nonetheless, is more prevalent in the
public sector. Some of the reasons for this difference are statutory in
nature, such as those resulting from the preemption of negotiated terms
by a pre-existing statute.'0
Other reasons for a broader unilateral change prerogative in the
public sector relate to the constitutional structure of state government
in which a legislature appropriates funds and an executive branch
manages state employees. As former law professor and circuit court
Judge Harry Edwards has stated, other public-sector labor law ques-
tions "pale by comparison to the problem of attempting to identify the
real public 'employer'. . . ."n This article examines two of these consti-
tutional dimensions. Part I discusses diffused management authority
resulting from the separation of powers with particular reference to
legislative authority over appropriations. Part II explores the legality
of governmental lawmaking that modifies previously negotiated labor
Governments, http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/0200ussl_1.html; see also Clyde
Summers, Bargaining in the Government's Business: Principles and Politics, 18 U. TOL.
L. REv. 265, 266 (1987) ("Labor costs may be seventy percent of a city's budget.").
7. See generally Michael Z. Green, Unpaid Furloughs and Four-Day Work Weeks:
Employer Sympathy or a Call for Collective Action? 42 U. CoNN. L. REv. 1139, 1143 n.16
(2010) ("[F]urloughs are mandatory time offwork with no pay.").
8. Oak Cliff-Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 1064 (1973) ("Nowhere in the
statutory terms is any authority granted to us to excuse the commission of the pro-
scribed action because of a showing either that such action was compelled by economic
need or that it may have served what may appear to us to be a desirable economic
objective.").
9. See, e.g., Wilkes-Barre Twp. v. Pa. Labor Relations Bd., 878 A.2d 977, 985 (Pa.
2005) (finding unilateral alteration of contract terms to be an unfair labor practice);
Educ. Minn.-Greenway, Local 1330 v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 316, 673 N.W2d 843, 853
(Minn. 2004) (finding unilateral alteration of expired contract terms to be an unfair
labor practice).
10. See Stephen F. Befort, Public Sector Bargaining: Fiscal Crisis and Unilateral
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1221, 1252-68 (1985).
11. Harry Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 Mica.
L. REV. 885, 903 (1973).
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agreements. Finally, the article concludes by suggesting that some
courts have construed these constitutional provisions in a manner
that affords second-class status to public employees and their collec-
tive bargaining agreements.
I. The Legislative Appropriations Function
Virtually every state constitution contains a provision that vests
exclusive authority over appropriations in the state legislature.12
State bargaining laws, however, usually define an executive branch
entity as the "employer" of state employees.' 3 This diffusion of author-
ity creates the potential for unilateral change if the legislature fails to
appropriate all of the funds necessary to implement a contract nego-
tiated by the executive branch.
A 2002 Florida decision, Police Benevolent Ass'n v. State, provides
a classic illustration.'4 In this case, a union and the state executive
branch negotiated a collective bargaining agreement covering state em-
ployees that provided for a five percent wage increase for fiscal year
2000-01. The legislature, however, appropriated only enough funds for
a two and one-half percent increase.' 5 The union argued that the state's
conduct violated the fundamental right to bargain collectively guaran-
teed in the Florida State Constitution.16 The Florida appeals court dis-
agreed and held that, pursuant to the separation of powers doctrine,
the legislature had the exclusive right to appropriate funds and was not
bound to fund the economic terms negotiated by the executive branch.' 7
Many other courts have reached similar conclusions with respect
to the state governmental level.' 8 The Minnesota Supreme Court has
held that even interest arbitration awards that order wage increases
for state employees are unenforceable absent a sufficient legislative
appropriation.' 9
Although less common, some state constitutions that vest appro-
priations authority in local bodies other than the employing entity
12. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(a); MiNN. CONsT. art. XI, § 1; W. VA. CONST.
art. X, § 3.
13. See Befort, supra note 10, at 1246.
14. 818 So. 2d 584 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
15. Id. at 585.
16. Id. at 586 (referencing FLA. CONsT. art. 1, § 6).
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Univ. of Alaska Classified Emp. Ass'n v. Univ. of Alaska, 988 P.2d 105,
108 (Alaska 1999); Cal. State Emp. Ass'n v. Flourney, 32 Cal. App. 3d 219, 234 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1973); State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 453 A.2d 176, 180 (N.J. 1982); In re
Advisory Op. to the House of Representatives, 576 A.2d 1371, 1374 (R.I. 1990). But cf.
Ass'n of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters Within the City of New York v. State of
N.Y., 577 N.E.2d 10, 16 (N.Y. 1991) (state legislature's initial approval of a multi-year
collective bargaining agreement for state employees bound the legislature to appropriate
sufficient funds for the remaining years of the contract term).
19. Minn. Educ. Ass'n v. State, 282 N.W.2d 915,918 (Minn. 1979).
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also have led to court decisions upholding unilateral change. In Phila-
delphia Federation of Teachers, Local No. 3 v. Thomas, for example,
the Philadelphia Board of Education (School Board) and the teachers'
union had negotiated a two-year collective bargaining agreement that
provided for wage increases in the second year of the contract.2 0
Under the governing constitutional and statutory scheme, the School
Board possessed no independent taxing authority and was dependent
on the Philadelphia City Council (Council) for funding.2 ' Due to fiscal
difficulties, the Council reduced its appropriation to the School Board
for the second year of the contract, and the School Board rescinded
the second-year wage increases. 22 The Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court sustained the School Board's action, ruling that the dependent
funding scheme made the contract severable in nature, with each year
of the contract subject to an implied condition precedent that adequate
funding be forthcoming. 23 Since this condition was not fulfilled, the
second year of the contract never came into existence, and the School
Board was not obligated to abide by the agreement. 24
The most recent appropriations decision-a California decision
grounded in a complex mix of constitutional and statutory provisions-
may also be one of the most significant. 25 Facing projected budget defi-
cits, then-California Governor Schwarzenegger issued an executive
order on December 19, 2008, implementing a mandatory unpaid fur-
lough of two days per month for state employees, including those re-
presented by unions.26 Several unions filed a lawsuit challenging the
governor's authority unilaterally to cut state employees' earnings as
established by various memoranda of understanding (MOU) through
the implementation of such a furlough. 27 On February 19, 2009, after
the unions filed the lawsuit, the state legislature passed a revision
to the then-current 2008-09 budget and separately passed an initial
2009-10 budget for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 2009.28
The California Supreme Court held that neither the California
Constitution nor state law granted the governor the authority to mod-
ify MOU provisions, even in the event of a fiscal emergency.2 9 Instead,
the court noted that the Dills Act governing collective bargaining for
20. 436 A.2d 1228, 1229-30 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1981).
21. Id. at 1230.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1233.
24. Id.; accord Sarasota Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Sarasota Classified Teachers Ass'n, 614
So. 2d 1143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
25. Prof'l Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186 (Cal. 2010).
26. Id. at 1192-93.
27. Id. at 1193. The California Constitution provides that the state legislature is to
enact a budget bill by June 15 of each year. CAL. CONsT. art. IV, § 12. subd. (c)(3).
28. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d at 1194-95.
29. Id. at 1218-19.
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state employees dictates that the establishment and adjustment of
salaries of represented employees are to be achieved through the col-
lective bargaining process, and that the resulting MOUs trump any
conflicting statutory provisions relating to the governor's powers.3 0
The court held, in contrast, that the legislature retains ultimate con-
trol over any expenditures required by a MOU, and by reducing appro-
priations in the two budget bills, the legislature validly modified the
MOUs and authorized the state to implement the reduction in em-
ployee compensation through the unpaid furlough program. 3 1
The apparent bottom line of the Schwarzenegger decision is that
the California legislature (but not the governor), through the budget-
setting process, retains the right unilaterally to reduce the level of
compensation for state employees as established in existing collective
bargaining agreements. 32 Interestingly, the lawsuit did not include a
challenge to the furlough program on Contract Clause grounds.
Three additional wrinkles in the appropriations jurisprudence
deserve mention. First, the pertinent constitutional provisions vest
state legislatures with power over the governmental purse but not the
power to alter collective bargaining provisions generally. This distinc-
tion was at issue in State of Florida v. Florida Police Benevolent
Ass'n.3 3 In that case, the state executive branch negotiated a three-
year collective bargaining agreement for peace officers that contained
provisions governing attendance and leave policy.34 In its general ap-
propriations act for year two of the contract period, the legislature
adopted a proviso seeking to amend the agreement by reducing the
available leave periods. 3 5 In determining whether this unilateral change
fell within the legislature's appropriations power, the Florida Supreme
Court applied the following test:
Where the legislature provides enough money to implement the ben-
efit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change the benefit,
the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit will be en-
forced.... Where the legislature does not appropriate enough money
to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the conditions it
imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if contradictory to
the negotiated agreement.36
30. Id. at 1218.
31. Id. at 1220, 1226.
32. But see State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31 (July 19, 2011) (Benn, Arb.)
(ruling on contractual but not constitutional grounds that a state employer is bound by
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement wage provision even in the absence of a
sufficient legislative appropriation of funds). Arbitrator Benn's award is available at:
http://www.state.il.us/ilrb/subsections/pdfs/ArbitrationAwards/State%20of%/o2OIllinois%
20&%20AFSCME,%20pay%20raises.pdf.
33. 613 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992).
34. Id. at 416.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 421.
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On remand, the district court of appeal found that the legislative ap-
propriations were sufficient to fund the leave benefits as negotiated
and declined to give effect to the legislature's attempted alteration.3 7
Second, a number of courts have ruled that the executive is not
free unilaterally to withhold funds following a valid legislative appro-
priation. In In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, for
example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court responded in the negative
to the question of "[wihether the Governor may unilaterally reduce,
impound and/or withhold from distribution more than $10 million of
funds lawfully appropriated by the General Assembly to the individual
cities and towns of the State of Rhode Island."3 8
An Iowa decision carries this principle a step further. In AFSCME/
Iowa Council 61 v. State,39 interest arbitration awards established the
terms of new labor agreements for units of state employees. The state
legislature appropriated sufficient money to fund the awards, but the
governor used a line-item veto to eliminate the wage increases provided
by the awards.40 The Iowa Supreme Court held that the arbitration
awards became a binding obligation on the state once the legislature ap-
propriated sufficient money to fund the awards.4' Even though the
court acknowledged that the governor's veto was not invalid as a matter
of law, the court held that the executive does not have the power unilat-
erally to withhold contractually obligated funds that the legislature had
already appropriated. 42
Finally, another Florida decision has ruled that a legislative body
has only one bite at the appropriations apple. In Chiles v. United Fa-
culty of Florida, the legislature, after initially funding a collective bar-
gaining agreement providing for a three percent pay raise, responded
to revenue shortfalls by attempting to modify the agreement through
the elimination of those raises. 43 The court held that the legislature's
initial act of funding is the point in time in which the agreement be-
comes binding on all organs of the state." The court explained that in
this instance:
[T]he legislature acted pursuant to its powers, appropriated funds
for collective bargaining agreements, and thereby created a binding
37. State v. Fla. Police Benevolent Ass'n, 653 So. 2d 1124, 1126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995), aff'd, 688 So. 2d 326, 330 (Fla. 1997).
38. 576 A.2d 1371, 1371 (R.I. 1990); see also Barry v. Bush, 581 A.2d 308, 313 (D.C.
1990) (District of Columbia Mayor may not unilaterally reduce the Board of Education's
fiscal year appropriations); Detroit Fire Fighters Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 537 N.W2d
436, 440 (Mich. 1995) (executive branch may not impound funds appropriated by city
council for an additional fire squad).
39. 484 N.W.2d 390 (1992).
40. Id. at 392, 395.
41. Id. at 395.
42. Id.
43. 615 So. 2d 671, 672 (Fla. 1993).
44. Id. at 672-73.
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contract. Having exercised its appropriation powers, the legislature
cannot now change its mind and renege on the contract so created
without sufficient reason. Separation of powers does not allow the
unilateral and unjustified legislative abrogation of a valid contract.45
As the Chiles court explained, once the legislature funded the collec-
tive bargaining agreement, further unilateral change was prohibited
absent compelling circumstances that would pass muster under the
Contract Clause of the Florida Constitution.46
The outcome in Chiles is in tension with the Schwarzenegger deci-
sion in which the California Supreme Court ruled that a downward
revision of the state's initial 2008-09 budget appropriation lawfully
permitted the furlough adjustment to the collective bargaining agree-
ments in question.47 At least three explanations for these differing
outcomes are possible. First, the Schwarzenegger court appears to
ground its result, at least in part, on a construction of the Dills Act.
Thus, the second-bite unilateral change upheld in that decision may
be premised on a legislative reservation of rights rather than on the
legislature's constitutional authority over appropriations. 48 Second,
the Chiles opinion specifically discussed the limitations on legislative
modification imposed by the Contract Clause, while that issue was not
mentioned in the Schwarzenegger decision. Finally, the two courts
simply may have a difference of opinion on this issue.
II. The Legislative Lawmaking Function
and the Contract Clause
The usual ban on unilateral change also may not apply when a
governmental entity with lawmaking authority, most often a state leg-
islature, enacts a statute or ordinance that attempts to alter the terms
of an existing collective bargaining agreement. If that entity is not a
statutory "employer" under the pertinent state labor-management
statute,49 the sole avenue for challenging such a modification is to pro-
ceed under state and federal constitutional provisions. 0
The Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution represents the prin-
cipal constitutional check on such legislative action.51 Although the
Contract Clause literally proscribes any impairment of contract,52 the
45. Id. at 673.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
48. See Prof'l Eng'rs in Cal. Gov't v. Schwarzenegger, 239 P.3d 1186, 1201 (Cal.
2010).
49. See Befort, supra note 10, at 1245-46 (indicating that most public-sector labor
relations statutes do not include the state legislature within the definition of a covered
public employer).
50. See AFSCME Council 6 v. Sundquist, 338 N.W.2d 560, 577 (Minn. 1983).
51. See Befort, supra note 10, at 1246.
52. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.1 ("No state shall ... pass any... law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts. . . . ").
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U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized that a state may modify a
contract by legislation that is reasonable and necessary to serve an im-
portant public purpose.53 This justification becomes more problematic,
however, when a legislative body impairs one of its own contracts for
the purpose of reducing its own financial obligations.
In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court inva-
lidated a New Jersey statute that retroactively repealed a covenant
between the state and certain bondholders that limited the use of
revenues pledged as security for rail passenger transportation pur-
poses.5 4 In striking down the statute, the Court adopted a heightened
standard for scrutinizing laws that impair public contracts, stating
that "complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness
and necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at
stake."55 Additionally, it noted that "a State is not completely free to
consider impairing the obligations of its own contracts on a par with
other policy alternatives."56 The impairment of public contracts is con-
stitutional, the Court stated, only if "reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose."57 The Court noted that an impair-
ment is "reasonable" only if the parties did not foresee at the time of
contracting the possibility of changed circumstances5 8 and is "neces-
sary" only if there are no less drastic alternatives available for safe-
guarding the public interest.5 9
The courts have struggled to apply the United States Trust Co.
standard in cases challenging unilateral alterations of collective bar-
gaining agreements. Over the past thirty years, more than twenty
published decisions have applied Contract Clause analysis to unilat-
eral government actions.60 Most of these courts properly applied the
principles established by the Supreme Court in United States Trust
Co. to restrict the permissible scope of self-serving legislative modifica-
tions. A significant and apparently growing minority of decisions, how-
ever, have afforded substantial deference to such modifications even
though they occurred in a context in which the legislative body was
hardly a disinterested observer.
The majority approach is illustrated by the Second Circuit's opi-
nion in Ass'n of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters Within the
City of New York v. State of New York (Surrogates I).61 In 1989, the
New York judiciary requested $972.9 million in order to expand to
53. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 434, 438 (1934).
54. 431 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1977).
55. Id. at 26.
56. Id. at 30-31.
57. Id. at 25.
58. See id. at 31-32.
59. See id. at 29-31.
60. See generally Befort, supra note 3.
61. 940 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1991).
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better cope with the state's "exploding drug crisis."62 The state, unfor-
tunately, also was facing a budget deficit at the time. The New York
legislature ended up reducing the judiciary's budget request by $69.1
million but, nevertheless, approved the judiciary's requested expan-
sion. In order to pay for the newly created positions, the legislature im-
posed a lag payroll scheme for certain nonjudicial employees of the
court system, which conflicted with the employees' collective bargain-
ing agreements. 63 A "lag payroll statute" essentially operates as an
involuntary loan to a public employer by delaying the point in time
at which employees receive payment of wages or salaries already
earned.64 The Second Circuit found that the impairment caused by the
lag payroll was substantial, focusing on the effect it would have on
individual employees. 65 The court refused to examine the governmen-
tal fiscal crisis without also regarding the "personal fiscal crises that
the lag payroll would create."66
The Second Circuit in Surrogates I also held that the lag payroll
statute in question did not pass muster under the United States Trust
Co. reasonable and necessary test. The Surrogates I court was skepti-
cal of the necessity of a lag payroll plan during what it described as
that year's "perennial 'fiscal cris[ils.'"67 The court read the necessary
requirement narrowly to mean that it must have been essential to im-
plement this particular plan due to the absence of any other possible
alternatives. The court found, however, that there were alternatives to
a lag payroll plan, albeit politically unpopular ones, like raising taxes
or shifting money from other governmental programs.68 The court
62. Id. at 769.
63. Id. at 769-70.
64. Id. at 769. The legislature delayed payment of employees' salaries until two
weeks after those salaries had been earned. Id.
65. Id. at 772. The court noted:
For instance, a 25-year-old employee would not be repaid her lagged wages
until she leaves the state's employ-perhaps 45 years, should she devote her
entire career to governmental service. The affected employees have surely re-
lied on full paychecks to pay for such essentials as food and housing. Many
have undoubtedly committed themselves to personal long-term obligations
such as mortgages, credit cards, car payments, and the like-obligations
which might go unpaid in the months that the lag payroll has its immediate
impact.
See also Univ. of Haw. Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999)
("Plaintiffs are wage earners, not volunteers. They have bills, child support obligations,
mortgage payments, insurance premiums, and other responsibilities. Plaintiffs have the
right to rely on the timely receipt of their paychecks. Even a brief delay in getting
paid can cause financial embarrassment and displacement of varying degrees of
magnitude.").
66. Surrogates 1, 940 F.2d at 772.
67. Id. at 774.
68. Id. at 773; see also Chiles v. United Faculty of Fla., 615 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla.
1993) ("The mere fact that it is politically more expedient to eliminate all or part of
the contracted funds is not in itself a compelling reason. Rather, the legislature must
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ultimately concluded that the legislature had not shown that it was
necessary to "plac[e] the costs of improvements to the court system
on the few shoulders of judiciary employees instead of the many
shoulders of the citizens of the state."69
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals took a distinctively different
approach to the Contract Clause issue in Baltimore Teachers Union v.
Mayor of Baltimore.70 In that case, the court found that Baltimore's
furlough plan7 1 constituted a substantial impairment of contract rights,
but ultimately held that the plan was permissible as a legitimate exer-
cise of the state's sovereign powers. 7 2
The Fourth Circuit adopted a broader reading of the United States
Trust Co. test, reasoning that "at least some deference to legislative
policy decisions to modify these contracts in the public interest must
be accorded."7 3 Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit, the ability to
raise taxes or shift funds from one governmental program to another
does not automatically preclude a finding of necessity. "Were these the
proper criteria," the court stated, "no impairment of a governmental
contract could ever survive constitutional scrutiny, for these courses
are always open, no matter how unwise they may be."74
The Fourth Circuit also found that the City tailored the plan "as
narrowly as possible to meet its unforeseen [budget] shortfalls."75 Be-
fore enacting the furlough plan, Baltimore abandoned previously
negotiated pay raises and resorted to measures such as layoffs, job
eliminations, and early retirement programs.7 6 Only when the State
proposed further cuts in state aid did the City resort to the furlough
plan.7 7 The court accordingly held that the plan was "necessary."78
demonstrate that the funds are available from no other possible reasonable source.");
Op. of the Justices, 609 A.2d 1204, 1211 (N.H. 1992) ("The legislature has many alterna-
tives available to it, including reducing non-contractual State services and raising taxes
and fees. Although neither of these choices may be as politically feasible as the furlough
program, the State cannot resort to contract violations to solve its financial problems.").
69. Surrogates 1, 940 F.2d. at 773. The court went on to query, "[i]f a state govern-
ment could so cavalierly disregard the obligations of its own contracts, of what value
would its promises ever be?" Id. at 774; see also Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. Massachu-
setts, 649 N.E.2d 708, 716 (Mass. 1995) (legislatively adopted furlough program consti-
tuted a substantial impairment of state employee rights as established by collective
bargaining agreements which could not be justified as reasonable).
70. 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
71. "Under the [Baltimore] plan, full-time city employees, except for firefighters ...
lost the annual equivalent of 2.5 days of pay, or.95% of their gross annual salary, and Bal-
timore saved approximately $2 million, which it does not intend to refund." Id. at 1014.
72. Id. at 1015.
73. Id. at 1019.
74. Id. at 1020.
75. Id. at 1021.
76. Id.
77. Id. In this context, the court concluded that the furlough plan was a moderate
course of action that was preferable to further layoffs. Id.
78. See id. at 1020-21.
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The Fourth Circuit further held that the plan was "reasonable"
under the circumstances.7 9 The plan was designed to "deal with a
broad, generalized economic or social problem."80 The plan extended
to all City employees as opposed to a narrow group such as in Surro-
gates I,81 and the plan was discontinued at the first opportunity.82 Fi-
nally, the court noted that the plan "affected reliance interests not
wholly unlike those of private entities in regulated industries, which
contract [is] subject to future, additional regulation."83 On this latter
point, the court stated that "[p]ublic employees-federal or state-by
definition serve the public and their expectations are necessarily de-
fined, at least in part, by the public interest. It should not be wholly
unexpected, therefore, that these public servants might well be called
upon to sacrifice first when the public interest demands sacrifice."84
Four recent decisions similarly illustrate the diversity of judicial
viewpoints. This set of cases, however, appears to signal a growing
trend toward treating governmental impairments more deferentially.
In Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled that unilateral action imposed by a legislatively-
created fiscal authority passed the reasonable and necessary test.85
The court gave substantial deference to the governmental action stat-
ing, "we find no need to second-guess the wisdom of picking the wage
freeze over other policy alternatives."86
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in 2008
that the City of Benton, Arkansas, violated the Contract Clause when
it unilaterally reduced employer health care premium contributions
for retired city employees.87 The court in that case examined the City's
plea of financial exigency on a de novo basis88 and concluded that the
City's evidence fell short of establishing the existence of an "unprece-
dented emergency" sufficient to warrant the City's unilateral action.89
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2010 decision upheld a
County's furlough plan that unilaterally reduced work schedules by
eighty hours during the 2009 fiscal year.90 The Fourth Circuit construed
79. The court noted that "the amount of the reduction was no greater than that ne-
cessary to meet the anticipated shortfall ... [and] the plan did not alter pay-dependent
benefits, overtime pay, hourly rates of pay, or the orientation of pay scales." Id. at 1020.
80. Id. at 1021 (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 235
(1973)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 464 F.3d 362, 371-72 (2d Cir. 2006).
86. Id. at 372.
87. AFSCME, Local 2957 v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 2008).
88. Id. at 878.
89. Id. at 882.
90. Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George's Cnty., 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
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the collective bargaining agreements at issue as incorporating the
County's Personnel Law, which expressly authorized the adoption of a
furlough plan upon the County Executive's determination that such a
plan was required in order to respond to a shortfall in revenue.9 ' The
court therefore concluded that since the furlough plan was authorized
by the collective agreements, no impairment resulted and an analysis of
the reasonable and necessary factors was not required.9 2
Finally, in United Auto Workers v. Fortuio, several labor unions
challenged a Puerto Rico law that sought to eliminate a $3.2 billion
deficit by freezing wages and benefits for a two-year period.93 Although
the plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the law unreasonably impaired ex-
isting labor agreements when less drastic alternatives were available,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals never reached the merits but dis-
posed of the case on procedural grounds. 94 The court began its analysis
by determining that plaintiffs in a Contract Clause challenge should
bear the burden of proof in showing that the challenged legislation was
not reasonable and necessary to serve an important societal purpose.95
Although acknowledging that this allocation of proof burden was in
some tension with the United States Trust Co. court's admonition
against complete deference, the First Circuit explained that this allo-
cation was appropriate in order to preserve a state's ability to deal
with financial exigencies without being subject to costly, but unsub-
stantiated, legal challenges. 96 Invoking the Iqbal/Twombly97 line of
cases, the court then ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to plead suffi-
cient facts to state a plausible claim that the legislation was not rea-
sonable and necessary.98 The court stated that the complaint merely
alleged conclusory statements, and failed to describe the specific provi-
sions allegedly impaired, the extent of the impairment, why the law
was excessively drastic, or the alternative measures available for re-
solving the budgetary problem.99
Conclusion
The state and federal constitutional provisions discussed in this
article provide for a system of checks and balances that complicate col-
91. See id. at 190-91.
92. See id. at 188-89.
93. 633 F.3d 37, 39-40 (1st Cir. 2011).
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 40.
96. Id. at 43.
97. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
98. United Auto Workers, 633 F.3d at 40-41 ("To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to re-
lief that is plausible on its face.'" (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949)).
99. Id. at 46-47.
Unilateral Change in Public-Sector Collective Bargaining
lective bargaining relationships in the public sector. On the one hand,
the legislature's constitutional authority with respect to appropria-
tions and lawmaking provides governmental entities with helpful
safety valves for responding to financial emergencies. On the other
hand, this authority heightens the potential for unilateral change and
the uncertain status of contractual promises.
With respect to the appropriations function, the principal policy
problem is the potential for unpredictable, mid-term unilateral change.
To avoid this scenario, states should structure their budgetary pro-
cesses so as to ensure, to the extent constitutionally possible,' 00 that
the appropriations term and the collective agreement term coincide.
Put another way, legislative approval of collective bargaining agree-
ments should be for the duration of the agreement rather than in a pie-
cemeal fashion.
As for the legislature's lawmaking function, a major concern is
that the apparent growing level of judicial deference to modifications
by legislatures represents an assessment that public-sector collective
bargaining agreements are not as worthy of protection as other types
of governmental contracts.101 This view is an undesirable vestige of
the discredited notion that public employees owe a duty of "extra loy-
alty" to the state.102 In the end, a governmental body should be sus-
tained in impairing its contract obligations to its employees on the
same basis as other self-serving impairments-that is, only when such
impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve an important govern-
mental purpose. 03
These proposals admittedly reduce to some extent the govern-
ment's ability to respond to emergency situations. But, they do so by
treating collective bargaining agreements in a fashion similar to other
governmental contracts, thereby promoting both predictability and
fairness.
100. Some state constitutions require their state legislature to adopt an annual ap-
propriations bill. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12, subd. (c)(3). In those states, it may
not be possible to synchronize multi-year agreements with the appropriations cycle.
101. See, e.g., Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir.
1993) ("[Plublic servants might well be called upon to sacrifice first when the public in-
terest demands sacrifice.").
102. See Befort, supra note 3, at 50-51.
103. Id. at 52-55.
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